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ABSTRACT
Participatory Sensing (PS) systems rely on the willingness of mobile users to participate in the
collection and reporting of data using a variety of sensors either embedded or integrated in their
cellular phones. Users agree to use their cellular phone resources to sense and transmit the data
of interest because these data will be used to address a collective problem that otherwise would
be very difficult to assess and solve. However, this new data collection paradigm has not been
very successful yet mainly because of the lack of incentives for participation and privacy concerns.
Without adequate incentive and privacy guaranteeing mechanisms most users will not be willing to
participate. This thesis concentrates on incentive mechanisms for user participation in PS system.
Although several schemes have been proposed thus far, none has used location information and
imposed budget and coverage constraints, which will make the scheme more realistic and efficient.
A recurrent reverse auction incentive mechanism with a greedy algorithm that selects a representative subset of the users according to their location given a fixed budget is proposed. Compared to
existing mechanisms, GIA (i.e., Greedy Incentive Algorithm) improves the area covered by more
than 60 percent acquiring a more representative set of samples after every round, i.e., reduces the
collection of unnecessary (redundant) data, while maintaining the same number of active users in
the system and spending the same budget.

v

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation
Studying large-scale variables in nature such as, temperature, humidity, noise or pollution requires the collection of a vast amount of data across a variety of locations. Today, this data is
collected and processed by means of sophisticated, accurate, and expensive sensors located in meteorological stations. Since the high costs and the location constraint of this equipment, many cities
do not have the necessary number of stations to satisfy the coverage demands. To overcome the
limitations, these systems use complex statistical methods of interpolation in order to estimate the
value of the variable of interest (i.e., temperature, humidity, pollution) in places located outside of
the stations’ scope. However, factors, such as long distance among stations and sudden changes
in the environmental conditions, may compromise the accuracy and reliability of these estimates.
An appealing alternative to this way of gathering environmental measurements is the involvement
of citizens in the process of collecting data. Lately, this way of gathering has been made popular
by the recent introduction of schemes of citizen participation such as Participatory Sensing (PS).
PS leverages the sensors embedded in the citizens’ mobile phones, allowing them to sense their
surrounding environment. Given the number, mobility and pervasive characteristics of large populations, the resulting data collected by them turned out to be more representative and accurate than
those gathered by a few meteorological stations. Additionally, the cost reduction of both implementation and maintenance as well as the ease of implementation, make PS a real alternative to the
current way to sense the environment.
In spite of its multiple advantages, PS is heavily dependent on citizen participation; people are
the system’s core. One of the main challenges to be addressed for the successful deployment of PS
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systems in real scenarios is ensuring the citizens’ participation. Since citizens do not have a direct
benefit from reporting data, the inclusion of incentive mechanism to encourage their participation is
essential.
This thesis presents the Greedy Incentive Algorithm (GIA), a reverse auction-based incentive mechanism based on the Reverse Auction Dynamic Price with Recruitment (RADP-VPC-RC)
mechanism proposed in [2], that not only includes provisions to retain the users but also algorithms
to obtain the lowest cost samples that are best distributed to cover the area of interest within a given
budget. This last part of GIA is achieved by the Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage (GBMC)
algorithm [3], allowing GIA to improve coverage by more than 60 percent, acquiring a more representative set of samples after every round.

1.2 Problem Statement
This thesis addresses two fundamental challenges in the design of incentive mechanisms for PS:
make the system economically feasible from an economical point of view and guarantee the area
coverage. The former challenge is a necessary condition for the sustainability of any project. Here
a global budget is evenly divided by the number of rounds, the procedure is presented in detail in
Section 3.4. In the latter case, ensuring the area coverage of the target area is a necessary condition to
obtain a representative set of sensing samples of the area of interest. After reviewing the proposed
incentive mechanisms for PS up to the current time, this thesis did not find any mechanism that
took the user location and a finite budget constraints into account. In order to make the system
economically feasible, the incentive mechanism must consider how to maximize a finite budget in
order to reward the largest possible number of participants. On the other hand, in order to acquire a
set of representative sensing samples (e.g., pollution samples of the city) the samples must be taken
in different places of region of interest so that the entire area can be covered by these samples. For
that reason, the participants location must be considered as a criteria for data acquisition.
One approach normally used to reward participants and guarantee their participation is based
on reverse auctions [2]. This approach is also used here. One of the advantages of reverse auctions
is that they involve participants in a race to sell their sensing samples and the auctioneer generally
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purchases the cheapest m ones, reducing the cost of maintaining the system working. On the down
side, in reverse auctions users may drop out of the system, jeopardizing the system altogether, and
therefore special mechanisms must be included to avoid this situation.
Although it is economically advantageous to buy the m samples with the lowest cost in every
auction round (i.e., maximizing the budget), the users may all be physically located very close to
each other, rendering pretty much the same information. In contrast, an incentive mechanism with
location and coverage constraints will not only buy the least expensive samples but also the ones that
are better distributed along the area of interest. Also, it is not practical to assume that the auctioneer
will always have an unlimited budget to run the system, and therefore, including a limited budget
per round makes more sense.

1.3 Contribution of this Thesis
One of main contribution of this thesis is a mechanism of incentives for PS that take into account a finite budget and participants’ location. Besides, the second chapter presents a survey that
summarizes the different PS incentive proposals up to the present time. This work also presents a
set of design issues and a qualitative evaluation of the current incentive mechanism for PS. On the
other hand, the role of PS is proposed in an emerging landscape of similar concepts involving citizen
participation. Finally, a three-level taxonomy is proposed, based on the type of user motivation used
for the current PS incentive mechanisms.

1.4 Organization of this Document
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explores the place of PS in a recent
landscape of frameworks that encompass it and similar tasks; presents the state of the art incentive
schemes for PS; and propose a set of design issues as well as a taxonomy of current schemes.
Chapter 3 discusses the algorithms’ design, elaborates on the parameters, provides a functional
specification, and describes the GIA algorithm components. Chapter 4 presents GIA’s performance
evaluation which include a set of three experiments. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and
provides directions for future research.
3

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents the state of the art incentive schemes for PS. A set of design issues are
proposed as well as a taxonomy of current schemes. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows:
Section 2.1 explores the roll of PS in a recent landscape of similar concepts. Section 2.2 presents
a set of design issues or desired requirements of PS incentive schemes. Section 2.3 presents a
taxonomy of the available incentive mechanisms for PS. Finally, Section 2.4 presents an qualitative
evaluation of the different systems, and the advantages and disadvantage of each one based on the
proposed design issues.

2.1 Similar Concepts
The revision of the state of the art incentives mechanism in PS has led to the discovery of a
variety of concepts such as Human Computing (HC), Crowdsourcing (CDS), Social Computing
(SC), Collective Intelligence (CI), and Citizen Science (CS), all of which seem to include PS and
always appear linked to it. This section gives a set of brief descriptions of each of these concepts,
and proposes the place of PS in this new landscape of related concepts.
Participatory Sensing is the process through which community members use the sensors embedded in their personal belongings (e.g., smart phones, bicycles, shoes, cars, etc) to measure a
complex spatial phenomenon in order to discover underlying patterns. [4] Human Computation is a
computing parading leverages the human capacity to solve some problems that computers does not
handle very well. A typical example is the human capacity to solve CAPTCHAS. CAPTCHA is
program that picks a random string of letters and then it renders the string into a randomly distorted
image. This program generates a test which consists of asking the user to type the characters that
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appear in the image. Humans can do it easily, however machines cannot. Another, term close to PS
is CrowdSourcing which is a mechanism used for several companies that consists of outsourcing a
task that used to be carried out by regular employees in order to reduce production costs and avoid
costly payroll. [5]
Citizen Science is also a popular model of citizen participation. This participation make possible
to accomplish research goals that otherwise would not be possible. Some of the most common tasks
carried out for the voluntaries include collection and data analysis, testing, and some times scientific
dissemination. Other models such as Social Computing emerged from the concern about social
behavior. This model is often understood in two different ways. On one hand, the concept may be
refereed as a way to support social behavior; this is the case of tools such as email, social networks,
blogs, and in general, all the computational ways to support human interactions. On the other
hand, this concept may be refereed to the different ways to support the computation carried out by
collectives. Some examples include prediction markets, online auctions, and reputation systems. [6]
Finally, the concept of Collective Intelligence is related with the knowledge that emerges for
the competition and interaction within groups. Although the members may not work together in a
coordinate way, an agreement seems to emerge. Financial markets are a good example to illustrate
this concept. In this case the stock price is not set just for an individual or in a coordinate way,
instead it emerge from the independent work of many people all of them working for their own
benefit. [6]

2.1.1

Place of Participatory Sensing

According to Paulos et al. [7, 8] the use of mobile phones as a measurement instrument for
environmental sensing is just one of several methods used in CS campaigns. Therefore, it is considered PS completely included in this framework. On the other hand, PS seems to intersect HC
in the sense that PS is clearly an alternative to the traditional way of sensing the environment (e.g.,
metereological stations) which involve machines and algorithms that lack the number and mobility
of human beings. However, authors such as Quinn and Bedersonm [9]; Yuen et al. [10]; and Doan
et al. [11] emphasize that the human participation in HC and CDS is directed by the computational
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Figure 2.1: Frameworks of Human Participation

system or process. From this point of view, when the PS task is carried out by a spontaneous group
of people with no clear guidance (e.g., using social networks) it can not be considered as part of HC
nor CDS. Besides, part of PS appears to be in the intersection of HC and CDS. On the one hand,
today the sensing process in PS may be carried out by machines in opposition to HC, but on the
other hand, the same task may be done by training employees (e.g., in opposition to CDS). In both
cases PS is an alternative for replacing either one, the machine mode or the employee mode, which
results in a trade off between quality and costs.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the place of PS in this landscape of related concepts; collective intelligence
is a superset of social computing and crowdsourcing, because both are defined in terms of social
behavior. Whereas human computation replaces computers with humans, crowdsourcing replaces
traditional human workers with members of the public. The key distinctions between collective intelligence and human computation are the same as with crowdsourcing (i.e., the system coordinates
human participation). However, there is an additional distinction that collective intelligence applies
only when the process depends on a group of participants. According to Quinn and Bedersonm [9]
given that the definition of PS does not say anything about groups, there could be an PS system of
a single worker in isolation. This is the reason that part of PS is outside of CI.
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2.2 Design Issues for Incentive Mechanisms in PS
The following characteristics were identified as necessary conditions for incentive mechanisms
for PS: Economic feasibility, data quality, area coverage, fairness, adequate number of participants,
adaptable to increased demands, and finally, works independent or dependent of the human control.

2.2.1

Economically Feasible

For any project, budget is a critical factor. Activities like PS need a critical mass of people to
maintain both reliability and coverage. However, budget concerns constrain these goals. Hence,
a key design issue is to maintain an equilibrium between reliability and coverage. A common
approach to address this problem is to estimate the reservation wage, which is defined as the lowest
wage rate at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job. That means that
a job offer involving the same type of work and the same working conditions, but at a lower wage
rate, would be rejected by the worker. However, according to Addison et al. [12] an individual’s
reservation wage may change over time depending on a variety of factors. Taking into account the
dynamic nature of this indicator, the introduction of additional components such as entertainment
and competitiveness may contribute to lower the reservation wage. Section 2.3 introduces some
dynamic monetary incentives for PS that combine monetary with intrinsic motivations to make
economically feasible the system deployment as well as non monetary mechanisms that use other
types of motivations to encourage user participation.

2.2.2

Data Quality

Information is the core of a PS system, and its incentive mechanism must ensure that potential
consumers receive a higher Quality of Information (QoI) according to their requirements. A natural
question is, how can a PS incentive mechanism encourage the collection of quality data? One of
the most common approaches utilized to address this problem is the use of reputation schemes.
Generally, users’ reputations may be computed from their past performances, the assessments of
their peers, or by a combination of those two. Yang et al. [13] proposes the use of this criteria to
rank participants in four levels that go from very trustworthy in the top 25% to very untrusworthy
7

in the botton 75% - 100%. On the other hand, Huang et al. [14] uses the Gompertz function to rate
the trustability level of the data provided by participants. In both cases, these reliability indicators
can be linked to credit incentives in order to encourage the user movement from low to top quality
levels. Once computed, this indicator (e.g., trustability index) may be used to predict quality. Pham
et al. [15] proposes the use of those indicators as a criteria for data acquisition. Pham et al. [15]
models the selection of participants as a multi-objective optimization problem, where quality is one
of the objectives and the outcome is the best trade off between quality and cost. Reddy et al. [16]
propose a feedback reinforcement method to assess metrics such as: timeliness capture, relevancy,
coverage, and responsiveness. The feedback component continuously reinforces the improvement
of these metrics by the use of monetary and social-base incentives. Finally, Liu et al. [17] propose
an on demand method for data acquisition, in which each query is associated with a required quality
level. User’s credit reward is linked to the QoI satisfaction index of the data customer. In this way,
depending of the query quality level requirement, it is directed to the group that may provide this
quality level.

2.2.3

Area Coverage

Another important goal of any PS incentive mechanism is always selecting the best subset of
users in order to estimate a complex spatial phenomenon (e.g., temperature, pollution, noise levels).
To address this problem Reddy et al. [18] propose the use of mobility profiles as part of the participant’s selection criteria in the recruitment process. Using a similar approach, Falaki et al. [19] and
Shilton et al. [20] propose increasing the participant’s demographic diversity and social network affiliation. They propose to leverage the mobility patterns of different groups to increase the sensing
coverage area, and also envision tackling problems such as language barriers by the use intrinsic
motivations. Kuznetsov and Paulos [21] propose the involvement of stakeholders such as students,
parents, bicyclists, and homeless people. They say that each of these groups is disseminated on
different public spaces. On the other hand, Lee and Hon [2] propose the use of Virtual Participation
Credit (VPC), a mechanism for sensing samples acquisition that uses a principle of locality that
assumes people with a similar reward expectation are clustered geographically.
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2.2.4

Fairness

Fairness is a key factor in accomplishing goals such as retention, coverage, and economic feasibility. Usually this concept is understood as the equal opportunity of participation. However, in
the case of dynamic pricing models based on reverse auctions, fairness is understood as a scheme
in which a user whose bid is cheaper has a higher chance to be selected than a user whose bids are
more expensive. In this case (incentives models based on reverse auctions), this feature (fairness)
may lead to a geographical coverage imbalance as well as user drop out. In the former case, because the participants with a lower reservation wage may be located in a particular region of the
target area, and in the latter case, because the samples will always be acquired from those with a
lower reservation wage causing that, after several periods of waiting, those with a higher one drop
out because they do not have the opportunity to participate. Some authors, such as Lee and Hon
[2] address this problem by the use of mechanism such as VPC and Recruitment (RC) which avoid
always acquiring samples from the same users (e.g., the cheapest ones). On the other hand, Pham et
al. [15] tackle this situation using a mechanism that not only considers the sample’s price, but also
its quality. Finally, Jaimes et al. [1] approach the same problem by means of a greedy algorithm that
not only considers the sample’s price, but also their location, which allows that the users’ location
as well as their mobility patterns, increases or decreases their chances to be chosen.

2.2.5

Adequate Number of Participants

Because the number of participants and their mobility patterns, PS seems to be an appealing
alternative to traditional sensing. Factors such as sensing frequency, target area size, type of phenomenon to be analyzed, and sensing demands can be used to determine the necessary number of
participants for a specific sensing request. However it is always necessary to have an additional
number of parcipants, given the uncertainty in terms of size, location and accuracy of next request
of sensing (e.g., sensing on demand) and the natural dropping out of participants (e.g., high frequency sensing). In some monetary based schemes, in which a budget constraint determines the
number of selected users, the starvation of participation may cause dropping out of them. This is
the case of [2, 15] in which the users must send the sensing data in advance, and then the system
9

decides based on factors like quality, whether to acquire them or not. In this case, the extra burden
of collecting and transmitting data without any reward may cause the user to drop out after a few
rounds. The inclusion of reputation schemes to predict data quality such those reviewed in section 2.2.2, may avoid this drawback. In this way, all the subscribers of a Phone Network Provider
(PNP) are potential participants of the PS system, and their participation depends on whether their
reward expectations are satisfied.

2.2.6

Adaptable to Increased Demands

Scalability can be defined in terms of how well a solution to problem will work when the size
of the problem increases. From this point of view, the incentive systems must have the ability
to maintain performance, usefulness, and usability regardless of expansion and concentration of
participants from local to a more distributed pattern. This expansion implies not only both an
increasing number of participants and the inclusion of new target areas, but also the inclusion of new
types of participants in terms of their intrinsic interests and expected rewards. It may be necessary to
use methods that dynamically adapt to different types of population according to their motivations.
In terms of number of nodes and area coverage, PNP are able to scale to millions of nodes, which
implies almost a total coverage. However, the ability to attract and maintain a wide range of users
based on their different types of motivations, has not yet been sufficiently developed. Approaches
such as Micro-Blog [22] combines the social incentives supplied by the use of social networks with a
type of incentive called “give and take” which encourages respond queries when they are generated
by strangers.

2.2.7

Independent / Human Controlled

An equally important design issue has to do with the ability of the system to work autonomously
in the absence of human intervention, i.e., continue encouraging the user participation in scenarios
in which the user acts as passive carrier of the sensors. Lane et al. [23] and Kapadia et al. [24]
classified the grade of user’s participation as opportunistic and participatory. In the former case,
users volunteer their cellphones to transparently sense the environment while they continue with
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their daily lives without being interrupted. They may not be aware of when or how their cellphones
are remotely tasked to collect and report data. In the latter case, users are actively involved in the
sensing process (e.g., taking a picture, manually activating a sensor, manually accepting or rejecting
a request for sensing). The emergence of hybrid systems such as [25, 26] that combine these two
approaches, leads to incorporating new characteristics like the inclusion of agents that automatically
negotiate on the user’s behalf. Sun and Nakata [27] propose a an agent-based architecture for PS
to overcome the lack of user’s active participation. This architecture includes four types of agents:
user agent, local agent, data verification agent, event monitoring agent, and central agent. User
agents provide raw data, which are processed by the local and verification agents, which in turn
send it to the database. The event monitoring agent analyzes and detects database anomalies and
potential hazards. Finally, the central agent is responsible for receiving and processing every query.
A detailed overview of the role that systems of intelligent agents play in the design of dynamic
incentive mechanisms is presented by Parkes et al. [28].

2.3 Taxonomy
PS incentives can be classified in different ways. One way is based on the level of user participation (i.e., Opportunistic or Participatory Systems). Since there are many incentives that apply to
both of them, in this thesis, the classification is based on the types of stimuli that encourage user
participation. In Figure 2.2, this classification approach initially identifies two large branches: Monetary and non Monetary incentives. The former is classified as either Static or Dynamic. The latter
are divided into the following categories: Collective Motives, Social Reward, and Intrinsic Motivesbased incentives. Finally, the Social Reward-based incentives are further divided as Interaction, and
Self-Interest-based incentives.

2.3.1

Monetary Incentives

When the sensing activity does not bring any immediate benefit for users, monetary rewards are
powerful motivators. They encourage participants to perform tasks that otherwise they would not
perform voluntarily. The way the reward is determined leads to two types of approaches: Static
11

Incentives for Participatory Sensing

No Monetary

Monetary
Static

Dynamic

Collective Motives

Social Reward
Interaction

Intrinsic Motives and Fun

Self Interes

Figure 2.2: Taxonomy of Incentives for Participatory Sensing

and Dynamic. In the former, the amount to pay to each participant is estimated in advance and
the amount may differ for each participant. In the latter, the payment depends on the reservation
wage of each participant. A common approach is to combine monetary rewards with other types
of incentives (e.g., Intrinsic Motives, Social-based incentives, etc) in order to decrease the user’s
reservation wage.

2.3.1.1 Monetary Static Incentives
Static types of monetary incentives include the first four of the five types of micro-payments presented by Reddy et al. [29]: Macro, Low, Medium, High, and Complete micro-payments. Reddy’s
findings showed that the way to estimate this payment affects the participation level and data quality.
In terms of quality and coverage, the most successful methods reported in this study were medium
and high micro-payments, and in terms of the number of submitted samples, the best method was
the dynamic one (i.e., Complete micro-payment). However, this type of macro-payment also caused
the highest level of users dropping out.
Musthag et al. [30] study confirmed these results using three types of micro-payments: Uniform,
Variable, and Hidden. In the Uniform scheme, a fixed amount was rewarded for completing a microtask; in the Variable scheme, random amounts were assigned based on a prior distribution; and in
the Hidden scheme, rewards again varied, but the amount was not revealed until after the microtask was completed. Their findings showed that in all the cases they retained around 62% of the
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participants, the percent of completion rate was slightly higher in the variable approaches with
86.92% followed by 86.26% and 81.68%. On the other hand, the Variable approach obtained the
highest level of positive participants perception followed by the Uniform and the Hidde one. Their
conclusion point out the superiority strategy of use Variant over Uniform, and the poor performance
of Hidden. Finally, they result confirm the findings of Reddy et al. [29] in the sense that the data
quality is influenced by the incentive strategy.

2.3.1.2 Monetary Dynamic Incentives
Lee and Hon [2] present Reverse Auction Dynamic Price with Virtual Participation Credit and
Recruitment (RADP-VPC-RC) an incentive mechanism inspired in micro-economic theory and motivated by the following scenario. There are n participants spread through the area of interest. They
are willing to sell their sensing data to an auctioneer who in turn wants to acquire the m less expensive samples, within a time window (i.e,. rounds). The same process is repeated for k different
rounds and is carried out through a reverse auction. The first component (RADP) is a recurrent
reverse auction that dynamically reduces the reservation wage of each participant. Figure 2.3 shows
the RADP-VPC-RC process overview. Once the auctioneer buys the m cheaper samples, the winners (i.e., those who managed to sell their samples) increase their bid’s price by 10% expecting to
increase their profits and losers decrease it by 20% in the hope of winning in the next round. In
order to model the drop out, losers (i.e., those who did not manage to sell their samples) evaluate
their ROI value (i.e., which is based on their reservation wage and sum of the cost that the user
incurs in collecting the data) which is represented by equation 2.1. If it is below a certain threshold,
then they withdraw from the system, otherwise they continue participating in the next round.
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Figure 2.3: RADP-VPC-RC Algorithm
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Sir =

eri + βi
pri .ti + βi

(2.1)

Here, eri corresponds to the earned reward by users i until round r, pri .ti corresponds to the
minimum reward, with pri as the number of participation instances of i up to the current auction
round r, ti as the user’s true valuation (reservation wage), and βi as the tolerance period. In order
to increase the level of participation, users who lost in the previous round r − 1 and continue
participating, grants a VPC vir = vir−1 + α , where α corresponds to the amount of VPC. Hence,
losers increase their chances to win by using their virtual bid’s price bri ∗ = bri − vir rather than
the real bid’s price. Additionally, the RC mechanism allows the auctioneer to communicate the
maximum price paid ϕk to a winner in the last round to the users who dropped out in previous
rounds. This information allows them re-evaluate their ROI and potentially return to the system in
the next auction round. This expected ROI is evaluated as follows:

Skr+1 =

erk + ϕk + βk
(prk + 1).tk + βk

(2.2)

This economic model avoids two typical problems of reverse auction: dropping out and cost
explosion, making the project economically feasible by means of the combination of RADP, VPC,
and RC. However, others problems such as: coverage and data quality are not totally addressed.
The former, is weakly tackled by the use of VPC and by a proposal of applying the RADP-VPC-RC
simultaneously in different regions, and the latter is not addressed at all. However, other proposals
such as Pham et al. [15] and Jaimes et al. [1] based on RADP, address those problems by using
multi-objective Knapsack and Budgeted Maximum Coverage approaches respectively.
Inspired by a similar scenario as above, Pham et al. [15] addresses the problem of selecting the
samples that will be acquired in each round, minimizing the ratio between the total price paid for the
acquired samples and its total quality (e.i., it is assumed that the network provider receives the samples, its price, and they determine its quality before acquiring them). This NP-problem is modeled
as an instance of a multi-objective Knapsack, where the constrain m is the number of samples to
be acquired, and objectives both maximize the quality of the acquired data and minimize the costs.
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They solve this multi-objective optimization problem by the use of techniques of evolutionary algorithm. This proposal includes three steps in which the Univariate Model Distribution Algorithm
(UDMA) [31] and Third Evolution step Generalized Differential Evolution (EGDE3) [32] algorithms are used to (1) select the initial population by a pair-wise tournament, (2) Use UMDA to
create the next generation, and (3) transform individuals from infeasible to feasible states. This
evolutionary process is repeated and the resulted individuals are the input for the next generation.
Their simulation results show that the proposed scheme acquires samples of high quality by 10%
less money than RADP and up to 15% less than Genetic Algorithms (GA) scheme. Besides, this
hybrid scheme solves the Knapsack problem three times faster than GA.
Another, representative approach is presented by Liu et al. [17]. This work presents a network
management framework to tackle three fundamental problems: maintaining energy supply, supporting quality information (QoI), and incentivizing the user participation so that the PNP obtains
maximum revenue. Even though the solution of the three problems are related each other, the first
two are outside the scope of this thesis, so here, is only dealing with the latter. The proposed framework is motivated for the following scenario. There are a set P of users subscribed to a PNP, and
a user (querier) that additionally owns a subscription to a PS plan offered by the company. Any
time the querier asks the PNP for contextual information about a site of interest k, the PNP in turn
re-directs the query to a set of N users within the proximity of k, with N ⊆ P . Once the query is
received, the users who decided to participate sending their sensing data, are rewarded based in the
PNP’s profits. In this dynamic pricing scheme, unlike the RADP-VPC-RC, the user’s reward expectation may be unknown in advance and must be predicted. The exponential smoothing method
is used to predict the current expectation reward of each user. This method uses the most recent
payment history to compute the current expected reward and the degree of satisfaction expressed by
the users who received this payments to adjust this value. Equation 2.3 shows the expected reward
for user i, who answers a query q with r attributes required.

i,r
ϕ
bi,r
bi,r
q = (1 − µ)ϕ
q−1 + ϕq , ∀i ∈ N, q ∈ Q,
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(2.3)

i,r
where ϕ
bi,r
q−1 , ϕq−1 , and µ ∈ (0, 1), correspond to the predicted and actual reward requirements

for the query q − 1 respectively and µ ∈ (0, 1) to a weight factor. On the other hand, the system

compute the exact participant’s reward, minimizing the sum of mean square error of the predicted
value computed in Equation 2.3 as follow:

ωq∗ = arg min

ωq − ωq−1
1 X i,r
{ϕ
bq − ωq (b
ciq )}2 subject to:
≤δ
N
ωq−1

(2.4)

i∈N

where δ represents an upper bound in terms of the percent of adaptation from PNP and b
ciq is the

type of information with which the user i responds to query q. Figure 2.4 sketch the final reward
computation process.

This framework addresses issues such as project’s economic feasibility, data’s quality assurance,
and requirements in terms of the number of participants. On the other hand, each query is associated
with r levels of QoI attributes. Once the PS system receive the answers to the query q, it fusion all
of them in order to offer a higher level QoI answer to the querier. Besides, quality indexes such
as µrq and µqq (i.e., required and attained degree of event understanding) are used to measure the
QoI satisfaction index. These ways to measure quality satisfaction allow easily identify quality
problem in the systems. On the other hand, the retaining is addressed by a combination of dynamic
credit reward and a reduction of impact of the participants power consumption. Other issues like
are coverage are not totally address, but can be inferred that it depends of PNP coverage service.
Finally, Xie et al. [33] propose an incentive mechanism motivated by an intermittent connection
environment like Delay-tolerant networks. Here, each query for contextual information is sending
to a group N with n members, within the proximity of querier interest site. Each query is associated
with a tuple (r, sr , m) which include the type of message r; a specific sink sr which is the only node
authorized to receive data of type r from nodes in N and deliver these data back to the querier; and
a message identification sequence number m. Given the nature of the network (i.e., intermittent
and low level connection) it is possible that the mobile node that obtained the information does not
have the opportunity to meet with the corresponding sink, and instead, have occasional encounters
with other nodes. Besides, the sink only rewards the node from which it get the data (i.e., even, if
this node was not the data generator), only if a copy of the data has not been acquired so far. In
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Figure 2.4: Dynamic Pricing Reward Model

this context, the proposed scheme incentivize a collaborative data trade between nodes, so that, the
information finally being reached by the sink, and it in turns can delivered it in a safe way to the
querier. This data trade is expected under the assumption that nodes are selfish and they want to
increase its profits. Therefore, they want to trade copies of different types of data, so that, when a
node meets a sink, this node has high chances to be rewarded.
Let Pi (r) denoted the probability that node i has an encounter with the sink. Let Am
i (r) be the
message appraisal, which is probability that other nodes, but i has not delivered any copy of the
message m to the sink that support r type of messages. Once two nodes i and j have contact, they
start the bargain process determining which information will be traded. This process is modeled
as a two-person cooperative game, and a Nash equilibrium is applied to reach the optimal solution.
Equations 2.5 shows the message appraisals values for nodes i and j before and after i sends a
message with sequential number m of type r to j. At this moment both node have a copy of m.


 Am (r) = [Am (r)] (1 − Pj (r))
i
i
h
i

m
 Aj (r) = Am
(r)
(1 − Pi (r))
j

sender

(2.5)

receiver,

Finally, the i node expected credit reward is given by equation 2.6

Rim = Am
i (r) × Pi (r)
2.3.2

(2.6)

Non-monetary Incentives

These type of incentives have been the subject of intense study and research. These type of
incentives allow the voluntary participation of citizens in research projects that otherwise would not
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be possible to carry out because its high costs of execution. Agencies like NFS strongly encourage
the use of these type of incentives in activities such as: gather information, data collection, analyze
samples, and analyze data, through framework such as CS [34] and PS. Some well-known examples of this type of projects include Galaxy Zoo [35] (i.e., a project that involve the participation
of citizens in the classification of galaxies), and eBird et al. [36] (i.e., a project headed by Cornell
Lab of Ornithology). These types of incentives have reached its climax with the advent of social
networks, the mass use of blogs, the new smartphones’ communication capacities, and in general,
technologies that support the interaction among members of networks and communities. Part of the
proposed classification of Non-Monetary Rewards-based incentives has been influenced by the theoretical work in social movement participation of Klanermans and Stekelenburg [37], and Simons
et al. [38] as well as the research of Nov et al. [39] who after surveyed 4376 volunteers, found that
collective, intrinsic and social-reward incentives were most significants factors of participation. In
the context of PS this thesis has identified two subsets of social rewards incentives: Interaction and
Self Interest. In the former case, rewards comes from the interaction with other members of the
network, among them are, recognition, new friends, reputation, and felt part of a community. In
the Latter, the reward comes from the use of the resources created by the community for personal
benefit.

2.3.2.1 Collective Incentives
This type of incentive encourages the attainment of a common good. This incentive was identified as primary motivation in PS, because ultimately this is the philosophy of PS, work together for
a common good (i.e., a better environment, a better community, and better planet). Once reached
the objective, everybody will benefit from the goal achievement, no matter whether they have participated or not. For instance a public PS campaign to measure pollution levels, will improve the
wellness of all the members of the community no matter whether they have or have not participated
personally. According with Simon et al. [38] the collective good may be insufficient as a motivating
force, because people can hope for a ”free ride.” In addition to the collective good, potential free
riders may also need additional incentives, which may have the form of social rewards, economic
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rewards, intrinsic motivation, and fun an entertainment. To this category belongs all the PS systems
which do not mention any type of incentive, because it is understood by default that the people will
participate for a common good.
Dantec et al. [40, 41] present a system oriented to the care in challenging environments. The
system leverage the advantages of the cellphones to provide care and shelter for homeless mothers.
Providers, staff, and people in need leverage the infrastructure to improve the logistic, that include
the grocery bargain hunting by the providers and allocation the resources by the staff.
Mendez et al. [42] present P-Sense a PS system for air pollution monitoring. The system include
sensors to measure levels carbon dioxide, combustible gas, carbon monoxide, and air quality as
well as temperature and relative humidity. The benefits in terms of wellness and conservation of the
environment from this system are part of the collective interest and represent a common good.
Kanjo [43] presents NoiseSPY a PS platform for urban noise monitoring. This system measure noise levels in order to generate map of sound levels that may be used for citizens and urban
campaigns to improve the noise contamination.

2.3.2.2 Social Incentives
Social motivation play a powerful roll in user participation. Having the opportunity to interact
with other members of the community, being aware about what they are doing, gaining reputation,
taking self benefit from content create by the community, and use the network as a self presentation
tool [44] are just some of the reasons since millions of people join each year to social networks.
In a survey about the motivating potential of the features for increasing participation in PS [26].
Answers were ranked from the least motivating (1) to the most motivating (10); features such as
being able to publicly comment on other participants observations (6.9 ± 2.8), and being notified of
other participants making observations on items that you had first observed (6.7 ± 3.2), indicating
that social networking aspects were highly desired. This results, along with other studies, suggests
that interaction among members of the community through social networks such as: Facebook [45],
Twitter [46], and Flickr [47, 48] is a strong way to incite people to take part in schemes of PS.
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2.3.2.3 Social Interaction Incentives
The use of technologies such as social networks, blogs, SMS, email, chat, VOIP have become
part of daily routines of millions of people around the word, as well as the primary way for social
interaction. PS systems like CenceMe [49] use the concept of ”sensing presence” which allow
participants of social networks share his/her status in terms of activity, disposition, habits, and
surrounding (e,g., temperature, ozone levels, noise) in a non-verbal way, which leads to new levels of
connections. This system leverage the incentive characteristics of participation in social networks,
the number of participants can growing at a similar rate as the members of social networks, coverage
and scalability are guarantee for the same mechanism. The system is feasible from an economical
point of view, and finally the system works independently and under human control.
Another PS system that use this type of incentive is NoiseTube [50], a monitor noise pollution
application that allows participants measuring and sharing the levels of noise around them. This
system apply the concept of social translucence [51] as a mechanism to support social interaction.
This concept based on visibility, awareness, and accountability is used by NoiseTube to increase the
level of participation via social stimulation. Participants can exhibit their contribution via Elog, an
environmental log which allows participants see maps of noise, show its contribution, and receive
feedback. Furthermore, the system can be embed as a web widget into web pages and social networks, allowing participants to be aware of his/her own and others participation, receive comments,
and make the information public with which in turn they get self promotion.
Micro-Blog [22] propose to handle incentives by means of a combination of social and explicit
mechanism. The former is address by the use of social networks, which makes possible the participation by the interaction of the social groups (e.g., friends in Facebook). However, in order avoid
confining the participation in social cluster, they propose the use of a pool of n free query credits
for each user (i.e., explicit mechanism). Each time a user make a query or reply to one, their credits
are decreased or increase respectively.
PIER [52] also use a model of incentives that include social interaction through social networks,
a careful manage of privacy, and control of the data shared. Users may compare the levels of
pollution exposure via facebook application module, and make and receive commentaries from
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other users. Authors envision include mechanisms of reputation to improve the reliability in the
share information.
One advantage of these incentive mechanism is that the PS system inherits all the advantages
in terms of recruitment and participation of the philosophy of social networks. On the other hand,
from the economic point of view, is economically feasible maintain the user participation. However,
none of the reviewed proposals mention how to cover the PS system operation costs. Followers of
these type of incentive approaches envision that PS operation costs will be charged to PNP and it in
turns will offer PS’s capacities as part of the service package.

2.3.2.4 Intrinsic Incentives and Fun
Authors like Wiggins et al. [36, 34, 53] have demonstrated how users can be involved in active participation projects under specific conditions. Intrinsic Motives-based incentives are aimed
at groups of people with specific interests. Typical examples of these type of incentive include
games and activities such as: gardening, and bird watching among others, where the majority of
participants volunteered due to their inherent interest. An example of the application of this type of
incentives is eBirding [54]. This project launched by the Cornell Lab of Ornithology, in partnership with the Audubon Society, is focusing on a specific target group called birders, who range from
sporadic to those whom observing birds becomes a life style. This project was initially based on a
science-centric model of participation (i.e., Collective incentives in this taxonomy), but shifted to
a birder-centric model when contributions plateaued in 2005. This new intrinsic motivation model
(i.e., Intrinsic) turned out in major changes in the system, that included different features specific
to the birder interest. After five years, contributions went from a few thousand to around two million observations per month [39]. This example suggests that intrinsic motivations may increase
significant the level of participation when the right intrinsic incentive is used for the right target
population, and the application is careful design with this purpose in mind.
On the other hand, intrinsic motivation like gaming, play an important roll in the recruitment
and retention of participants. Every day, people around the world spend millions of hours playing
computer games. A recent report of the International Game Developer Association (Igda) [55] revels
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that over 200 millions people, i.e., over 25% of all Internet users, play online games every week.
Authors such as Von Ahn, Law, Dabbish, and Hacker [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63], [64] have
pointed out about the potential of a type of games called casual games in which the development of
tasks are part of a game. One of first works in this field, was the ESP Game [63], this is an online
game that links anonymous online individuals and has them independently tag a random online
image. Once they separately suggest an identical tag, they receive points for how quickly they did so.
Thus, the system ends up with independently confirmed (i.e., validated) semantic information about
the photo. This game with potential applications in language translation, Monitoring of security
cameras, Improving Web search, text summarization according with Von [64], was licensed by
Google in 2006, who made its own version called the Google Image Labeler [65]. According
with Von [62] the games design with a specific purpose “Human Computation Games” must be
constrained by the computational problem to solve; which involves a trade off between between fun
and practicality.
One of recent applications of this type of incentives to PS is presented by Han et al. [26]. In
order to measure the impact of use intrinsic incentives like gaming in PS projects, the CENS lab
of UCLA chose the BudBurst project [66] as a testing platform. BudBurst is an environmental
CS national project that engage citizens in the collection of ecological data. CENS team created
a playing infrastructure which allow to participants tag location information about the observed
plants; visualization features like maps and display of gain points; and Floracaching [67] a variant
of the well-know game geocaching. A post-experiment survey asked to participants to rank from 1
to 10 in increasing order, the experiment’s most motivating elements, game was highly ranked (7.9
± 1.5), followed for social interaction (6.3 ± 3.4). This findings show the potential of the incentives
schemes based on gaming for engage user participation.

2.3.3

Self-benefits

Finally, the type of users’ incentive mechanisms based on the direct benefit obtained by for their
participation were reviewed. In this type of scheme users receive immediate gratification for their
participation, benefiting from content created by other participants [68]. This is the case of initia-
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tives that require sharing of knowledge or experiences. By adding your own facet of information
to the project, it becomes framed on a greater scale. For instance, users may submit the local price
of milk, lettuce, beer, gas, etc or just take a picture of its bar code and receive an instant feedback
about the price of same products in near stores. In other words, while users are making a query by
sending a bar code picture, they are populating the database. This is the case of LiveCompare [69]
that allows for grocery bargain hunting through PS. Other application are PetrolWatch [70] and and
MobiShop [68] systems based on PS that leverage the ubiquity of smartphones to share consumer
gas pricing information.
These PS system of specific purpose has an special target population, and it is a challenge
incorporation this types of incentive into more general application. They have a great potential, in
part because users is paying for each query with their participation, In fact, due to the utility in terms
of user’s money savings, they have great commercial potential.

2.4 Performance Evaluation of the Current Systems
The qualitative comparison of the incentive systems has been hindered by the fact that each
system works over different scenarios, use different approaches, and works for a specific sensing
model. Some of the systems correspond to operational implementations, other are pilot experiments,
and some other are theoretical models tested using simulations. However, the evaluation is based
on the results of the experiment, simulation, or a proposed approach. For example, those systems
that use social networks, it follows that the network provides coverage. In other cases like [30] the
N/A on a field of Table 2.1 indicates that this metric is meaningless in that context. Finally, The
absence of X on the a field of the same table denotes that the design issue has not even been taken
into account or that simulation results show a poor performance.
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Table 2.1: Classification of the Type of Incentives in Terms of Design Issues

Monetary

Type of Incentive
Static

Incentive Mechanism
Macro-Micro -Payments [29]
High Micro-Payments [29]
Medium Micro-Payments [29]
Low Micro-Payments [29]
Uniform Micro-Payments [30]
Variable Micro-Payments [30]
Hidden Micro-Payments [30]

Dynamic

Social Rew

Interaction

No Monetary

Self-Inter

Collective

intrinsic motives

RADPC-VPC-RC [2]
Dynamic Price [15]
Manag for Context-Aware [17]
Bargain-based [33]
Complete Micro-Payments [29]
CenceMe [49]
NoiseTube [50]
Micro-Blog [22]
PIER [52]

EcoFeasi
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Quality

X
X

X

X
X
X
N/A
N/A
N/A

Coverage
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Design Issues
Fairness
Num of users
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

LiveCompare [69]
PetrolWatch [70]
MobiShop [71]

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

CRM [40]
P-Sense [42]
NoiseSPY [43]

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

eBirding [54]
Floracaching [26]

X

X
X

X
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X
X
X

X
X

Scalability

Control

X

X

X

X

X

CHAPTER 3
THE GREEDY INCENTIVE ALGORITHM

This chapter discusses the algorithms’ design, elaborates on the parameters, provides a functional specification, and describes the GIA algorithm with the help of a sample model.
RADP-VPC-RC and the GBMC algorithms are important components of GIA . While RADPVPC-RC tackles the problem of cost explosion and avoids users from dropping out of the system,
GBMC considers the location of the users, the coverage, and the budget constraints of the auctioneer. With these two algorithms together, GIA buys samples within the spatial and temporal coverage
needed under a fixed budget. Further, GIA does not assume static users and rather includes additional mechanisms to encourage user mobility as a mean to extend the geographical coverage even
further.

3.1 Geometric Coverage Model
In order to address the coverage problem, GIA uses the following geometric disk model

f (d(ui , uj )) =



 1


 0

If d(ui , uj ) ≤ R

(3.1)

Otherwise

where d(ui , uj ) is the Euclidean distance between a sensor ui and another sensor uj , and R > 0
is a constant that defines the area of coverage of each sensor. Indeed, this function defines a disk
centered at sensor ui with radius R. All sensors within such a disk have a coverage measure of 1
and are said to be covered by sensor ui . On the other hand, all sensors outside such a disk have a
coverage measure of 0 and are said to be not covered by this sensor.
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Figure 3.1: Example of Coverage per User

3.2 Relationship Between Geometric and Auction Models
One of main characteristics of the GIA for sample acquisition consists in the modification of
the RADP-VPC-RC auction scheme. This auction mechanism is meant to buy k units in increasing
order of cost. In this scheme, the geometric coverage model described before was used to carry out
this process. Here, every sensor is drawn as a disk of radius R centered at its location, as shown
in Figure 3.1. Of course, each sensor is covered by at least the disk centered at itself. The natural
question here is: Does there exist a sub-collection of disks whose union cover all the points? If the
elements covered by diski are assigned to the set Si for i = 1, . . . , n, where n is the number of
disks, the previous problem becomes the well-known NP-Complete Set Cover Problem.

3.3 The Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage Algorithm (GBMC)
The heart of the incentive mechanism is the Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage (GBMC)
algorithm, which is executed in every round of the auction to decide which samples to buy. The
algorithm, which is detailed in pseudocode in Algorithm 1, finds a S ′ ⊆ S that covers the greatest
possible area covered by S within the budget constraint.
Let assign the elements covered by each diski to each set Si , associate the weight wi of Si as its
cardinality, and its cost ci as the cost of the sample provided by the sensor ui located at the center
of the diski . Let G⊆S be a collection of sets, w(G) and c(G) denote the total number of elements
covered by G and the total cost of the sets in G, respectively. Let Wi′ , i = 1, . . . , n, denote the
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total number of elements covered by set Si but not covered by any set in G. The problem now can
be stated as follows: Given a set U of n elements, a collection {Si }, i = 1, . . . , n of subsets of
S, and a budget L, find a subset S ′ ⊆S such that the total cost of elements in S ′ does not exceed
L and the total weight of elements covered by S ′ is maximized. This NP-hard problem, presented
by Kuller [3] in 1999, is known as the Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem. The BMC problem
has been used by authors such as Leskovec [72] and El-Arini [73] in their work on monitoring the
blogosphere, and Curtis [74] in merging infections.
Algorithm 1, which is the greedy algorithm proposed in [3] to solve the BMC problem, solves
this problem in three steps. Rather than buying the cheapest k samples, it acquires samples using
the following criteria. The first step uses the sub-routine GREEDY AREA PRICE(S), which takes as
input the collection S and selects at each step a set Si that maximizes the ratio Wi′ /ci . The second
step uses the sub-routine GREEDY AREA(S), which selects at each step a set Sj that maximizes Wj′
constrained to the budget. The collections G and G′ returned by the first and second sub-routines
are the candidates for the final output. Finally, the last step uses the sub-routine GBM C(), which
outputs the candidate solution having the maximum weight.
Clearly, the weight or number elements covered by the collections G and G′ depends on R.
When R tends to zero, the number of elements of Si tends to 1 and the expression Wi′ /ci becomes
1/ci , which reaches its maximum when ci reaches its minimum. In this case, the RADP-VPC-RC
and GIA systems are equivalents. However, as the length of the radius is increased, more samples
are included in diski , and once a sample provided by ui is purchased all the samples within a
distance less than or equal to R are considered redundant and are discarded as candidates to be
acquired. Section 2.4 presents an analysis about the influence of radius R over the number of active
participants.

3.4 Budget
One of the main assumptions made in most previous works is that of an infinite budget to tun the
auctions. This assumption is not realistic in practice, as data collectors may have budget constraints.
In the proposed mechanism, the system runs with a limited budget. Here a global budget is evenly
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Algorithm 1: The Greedy Budgeted Maximum Coverage Algorithm for GIA.
input : S a collection of sets made up by the user locations
output: S ′ ⊆ S, covering set
GREEDY AREA PRICE(S)
begin
G←∅
C←0
U ←S
while U 6= ∅ do
W′
select Si ∈ U that maximizes cii
if C + ci ≤ L then
G ← G ∪ Si
C ← C + ci
end
U ← U \ Si
end
return G
end
GREEDY AREA(S)
begin
G′ ← ∅
C′ ← 0
U′ ← S
while U ′ 6= ∅ do
select Sj ∈ U ′ that maximizes Wj′
if C ′ + c′j ≤ L then
G′ ← G′ ∪ Sj
C ′ ← C ′ + c′j
end
U ′ ← U ′ \ Sj
end
return G′
end
GBM C()
begin
G ← GREEDY AREA PRICE(S)
G′ ← GREEDY AREA(S)
if (w(G) ≥ w(G’)) then
S’ = G
else
S’= G’
end
end
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divided by the number of rounds or auctions. However, at the end of each round ri , if the total
amount of budget assigned to round ri is not used completely, then the remaining part is added to
round ri + 1.
3.5 Advantages of the GBMC Algorithm
This section illustrates the advantages in terms of coverage of using the GBMC compared
with other popular algorithms such as the Greedy Set Cover (GSC) algorithm Presented by Kleimberg and Tardos [75], which maximizes Wi′ /ci and corresponds to the sub-routine GREEDY
AREA PRICE of the Algorithm 1.
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Figure 3.2: The Proposed Incentive Mechanism
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The following example illustrates how the GBMC overcomes problems where the well-known
GCS algorithm fails. Given a deployment of N users in a target area, and radius R, consider the
following scenario. Two users (sensors), u1 and u2 , cover 1 and p users respectively including
themselves, in other words, their samples have weighs W1′ = 1, and W2′ = p. Let us assign the
costs ci = 1 and c2 = p + 1 for these samples and let us define the total budget L = p + 1. In
this situation, Algorithm 1 acquires u2 whereas the GSC algorithm purchases u1 . Remember, that
the optimal solution consists of covering the maximum number of participants given a budget. Let
p = 10. In this case, GSC tries to maximize Wi′ /ci for i = 1, 2, which results in the purchase of
u1 because W1′ /c1 > W2′ /c2 given that W1′ = 1, c1 = 1, W2′ = 10, c2 = 10 + 1. However, in
the second round there is not enough budget to acquire u2 because one unit has been spent in the
first round and the remaining 10 units of budget are not enough to acquire u2 . In contrast, by using
the budgeted approach, GBMC first uses the sub-routine GREEDY AREA PRICE that returns the
decision to acquire u1 , as the GSC algorithm does; however, the final decision is postponed until
it compares it with the decision returned by the GREEDY AREA sub-routine. GREEDY AREA, on
the other hand, acquires the sample ui that maximizes the number of elements covered Wi′ without
violating the budget for i = 1, 2. In this case GREEDY AREA acquires u2 because W2′ > W1′ . The
final decision is taken by the final routine GBMC() that takes as input the results returned by the
two prior sub-routines and decides which of the results will be acquired comparing the number of
elements covered by each one. So, in this case, the final decision is to purchase u2 . Although in
this case there is not enough budget to buy the other sample in the next round either, it is important
to emphasize that the purchasing entity will cover the same area but will be left with more money.
Nonetheless, when there is enough money to buy many samples in many rounds, this three step
process will show its performance advantage over the other one, in particular, in terms of coverage.
This advantage will be shown later in the thesis.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

4.1 Modeling the PS System Components
This chapter describes how the different parts of the PS system were modeled and presents the
results of the performance evaluation comparing the proposed mechanism versus RADP-VPC-RC.
Part of this work was published in [1] (Copyright c 2012 IEEE)
Table 4.1: Simulation Parameters Copyright c 2012 IEEE [1]
Parameters

Experiment 1

Deployment area
Instances
Deployment distribution
Deployment distribution

Uniform true valuation distribution
Normal true valuation distribution
Exponential true valuation distribution
Normal true valuation distribution
RADP-VPC-RC
GIA
Radius R
Budget per round
Beta
Alpha
ROI Threshold

Experiment 2

Experiment 3

100m x 100m
100
uniform

[0,10]
µ = 5, σ = 2
µ=5

no
yes
1:10
100
(3,7)
not used
0.5

yes
yes
5
20:200
(3,7)
7
0.5

Four normal distributions
with parameters:
µ1
=
(30, 80),
µ2 = (80, 80), µ3 =
(50, 50),
 µ4 = (90, 30),
40
0
Cov=
0
40
no
yes
no
µ1 = 5, µ2 = 10, µ3 =
15, µ4 = 20, σ = 2
yes
yes
5
0:350
(3,7)
not used
0.5

The GIA incentive mechanism, which is shown as a flowchart in Figure 3.2, works in rounds,
as follows. Initially, a number of users are randomly distributed over the area of interest. For this,
we used 2-dimensional uniform and normal distributions with the parameters shown in Table 4.1.
Those users who are located in the area of interest receive a message announcing that a new round
is about to start. Users interested in the auction set their true valuations ti , which are randomly
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generated. We perform experiments using a normal, uniform, or exponential distribution with the
parameters specified in Table 4.1. For each ti , a bid price bi is randomly generated from a uniform
distribution between ti and 1.5ti . Then, the system generates a set of user locations, which are
associated to the bid prices. With this information, a file indexed by user IDs is generated to allow
us to track the behavior of the users through the different rounds. This file serves as the input to
Algorithm 1 that determines which and how many samples will be purchased given the bid price,
the location of the users, and the budget per round. At this point, Algorithm 1 chooses the winners
of the round, those users to whom the system will buy the samples from. Subsequently, 50% of
those winners, randomly selected, increase their bid prices by 10% and all the losers decrease their
bid price by 20%. Then, all the participants increase their participation counter by 1. Next, the
losers evaluate their Return of Investment (ROI) index using Equation 2.1. If this value is above a
pre-defined threshold, equal to 0.5 in this work, they remain participating in the auction; otherwise,
they drop out. At this point, the system sends the highest price paid per sample and the locations
that were not covered in the previous round to those users who dropped out of the system in previous
rounds. Using this privileged information, these users (losers) evaluate their chances of winning in
the next round evaluating his ROI function for the next round using Equation 2.2. If this value is
above the threshold, they rejoin the system with a 50% probability; otherwise, they remain out of
the auctions. Also, users could use the location information to move to different areas and increase
their chances to win the auction. This process continues and losers constantly receive this privileged
information and test their chances to rejoin. The entire process repeats until a series of n different
rounds are carried out, which in our case n = 1000, or the data collector runs out of money. It is
worth mentioning that, for comparison purposes, the values utilized in all the parameters described
in this paragraph are the same ones used by the authors of RADP-VPC-RC in [2].
Another part of the system that needs to be modeled in the simulation tool is the user mobility.
As stated before, we do not assume static users. After a random initial deployment, the mobility
algorithm computes the locations of the participants for the next round using a displacement vector
→
−
( R ) that contains their displacement from the previous round. This vector is defined as the addi→
−
→
−
tion of a displacement vector on the X axis ( X ) and another vector on the Y axis ( Y ), meaning
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Figure 4.1: Radius vs. Number of Active Participants Copyright c 2012 IEEE [1]
→
−
→
−
→
−
R = X + Y . The displacement vector on each axis is generated using a random function (i.e.,
(−1)uni(0,2) ) that defines the mobility direction. Note that the magnitude of the vector represents the
participant’s speed, which value is generated as the multiplication of the number of steps, randomly
generated between 0 and 3, times the step length, randomly generated between 0 and 11.

4.2 Performance Evaluation
Three sets of experiments are included. The first set is meant to determine the ideal length of
radius R. Once an ideal R is found, the second set consists of experiments to compare the average
number of active participants, and average cost per round between the RADP-VPC-RC and GIA
algorithms using different distributions for user true valuations. Finally, the third set of experiments
is meant to demonstrate the superiority of the GIA algorithm in terms of coverage under conditions
of stratified locations of the participants in the area of interest.

4.2.1

Experiment 1: Determining the Ideal Length of Radius R

In order to study the relationship between the radius R and the number of active participants
and the average price per round, the length of R was increased from 1 to 10 in steps of one. One
thousand rounds were executed and the experiment was repeated 50 times and the results averaged
using a fixed budget of 100 units per round. For every length of R, the average number of active
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Figure 4.2: Radius vs. Budget Assigned per Round Copyright c 2012 IEEE [1]

participants was recorded. This process was carried out using three different distributions for the
true valuations of the users and the uniform distribution for the initial deployment of the participants. The idea behind this experiment is to find the length of the radius R for which the average
number of active participants decreases significantly. Figure 4.1 shows that when the radius R is
increased beyond 5, the number of active participants decreases regardless of the distribution. This
is based on the following rationale. If the radius is set as long as the distance from the center of
the user to the farthest point, the algorithm will only buy one sample because this disk will cover
the entire population. However, from the sensing point of view, the sensed data might not be a
good representation of the real values in all places. On the other hand, if the radius is too small,
the algorithm will buy more samples than necessary, as the users are too close to each other and the
data will present a high level of redundancy. In short, there is a tradeoff between the radius R and
the granularity and quality of the sensed data.
Figure 4.2 shows that if a radius bigger than 5 is used, the GIA algorithm does not use all the
allocated budget per round to buy samples. However, when R ≤ 5 the algorithm still uses the entire
budget per round. Putting the results of these two figures together, turns out that value of R = 5
provides a good level of participation while rendering non redundant data. In practice, however, the
value of R has to be set to a number that considers how the variable of interest changes with the
distance.
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4.2.2

Experiment 2: Comparing the Performance Metrics

The main goal of this experiment is to determine the number of active users in the system as
the budget per round is increased from 20 to 200 when the users set their true valuations using a
normal distribution with µ = 5 and σ = 2, an exponential distribution with µ = 5, and a uniform
distribution between [0,10]. In the case of the GIA algorithm, a radius R = 5 was used.
Figure 4.3(a) shows that both algorithms present a very similar performance buying a similar number of samples per round per budget. This result basically says that both algorithms, GIA
and RADP-VPC-RC, include effective methods for user participation and rejoining the system. Although the number of active users are similar, the GIA algorithm buys samples in a different manner
since it avoids to buy samples from close by places that will render fairly similar or redundant data.

4.2.3

Experiment 3: Comparing Coverage

The main goal of this experiment is to compare the amount of the area of interest covered by
the GIA and RADP-VPC-RC algorithms. For this purpose a stratified scenario was simulated. This
scenario could correspond to the case where participants from different socioeconomic status having
different true valuations live in distinct regions of the area (city). In this scenario the RADP-VPCRC algorithm does not choose a representative sample of the population and instead, purchases data
containing a high level of redundancy. On the other hand, GIA is able to buy non-redundant samples
from each of the user types. The initial user deployment of locations was generated with a cluster
structure. Four clusters with µ1 = (30, 80), µ2 = (80, 80), µ3 = (50, 50), and µ4 = (90, 30)
respectively, and covariance matrix


40 0 
Cov = 

0 40
were generated with 25 locations each, for a total of 100 locations. The true valuations of the users
were generated using normal distributions with µ1 = 5, µ2 = 10, µ3 = 15, µ4 = 20, and σ = 2.
Each cluster of true valuation was associated with a cluster of location in order to simulate the
expected scenario.
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Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of area covered, the number of active participants, and total cost
per round for the two algorithms as the number of samples acquired varies from 5 to 50 in steps of
5. From the Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b), it is clear that both algorithms have a similar number of active
participants and spend a similar amount of money to buy their samples; however, as it is shown in
Figure 4.4(c), it is also clear that the GIA algorithm buys those samples from users who are more
spread throughout the entire area of interest, thus providing a better coverage and therefore reducing
the acquisition of redundant data. For example, this last figure shows that when fifty samples are
acquired, the GIA algorithm covers up to 64% more area than RADP-VPC-RC.
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(a) Normal distribution.

(b) Exponential distribution.

(c) Uniform distribution.

Figure 4.3: Experiment 2 - GIA vs. RADP-VPC-RC Copyright c 2012 IEEE [1]
39

(a) Number of Samples vs. Number of Active Participants

(b) Number of Samples vs. Cost

(c) Number of Samples vs. Percentage of Covered Area

Figure 4.4: Experiment 3 - GIA vs. RADP-VPC-RC Copyright c 2012 IEEE [1]
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

5.1 Conclusions
This thesis presents the Greedy Incentive Algorithm (GIA), a location-based reverse auction
incentive mechanism for participatory sensing systems with budget constraints. The algorithm uses
the location of the users to improve the coverage of the area of interest and reduce the collection
of redundant data. Simulation results show the superiority of the GIA algorithm compared with
RADP-VPC-RC, another reverse auction mechanism found in the literature. In general, the GIA
algorithm is shown to increase the area coverage by up to 64% while maintaining a similar amount
of active users in the system and spending a similar budget than the RADP-VPC-RC algorithm.
Future work is under way to model the dynamic admission of new users, as the continuous
admission of new members in any round might be useful to find an equilibrium among the average
number of active participants, fair prices paid per the sample, and the budget constrains. Future
work include the use of Game Theory to further analyze these systems. Other future works include
looking at more realistic models to simulate R and the mobility of the users as well as different
ways to establish the true price and ROI for different users.
This is also the first work that survey the state of the art of mechanism of incentives for PS.
Additional to GIA, this thesis include the following contributions. First, the role of PS in a emerging
variety of similar concepts that share several characteristics with PS and identifies the relationship
of PS with each of them. Second, a set of design issues are proposed which are used as metrics to
evaluate incentive mechanisms for PS. Third, a tree-level taxonomy is proposed base on the type of
user motivation used for the current PS incentive mechanisms. Fourth, a set recommendations and
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guidelines are proposed for future research. Finally, the main components of a sensing data market
architecture that supports the three types of PS models reviewed in this survey are proposed.

5.2 Future Research
After having reviewed the state of the art in terms of incentives mechanisms for PS, some ideas
and research guidelines are proposed for future research.

5.2.1

Costs and Utility Functions

It is necessary to propose functions to estimate the cost of data acquisition base on factor such
as: true valuation T , data level of perturbation for location privacy purposes P ; quality of the
sensor q used for the data acquisition; elapsed time since the data request was done and the sample
was taken; user’s reputation R; user’s location (e.g., coverage) L; and finally, taking inspiration
from [33] the data’s appraisal A as showed in equation 2.5 as a criteria of data acquisition.

C : (T, P, q, time, R, L, A) → ℜ

5.2.2

(5.1)

Schemes that Support Different Models of Sensing

In Section 2.3.1 four proposals were reviewed aimed to three different types of sensing model.
The first model consider sense a region continuously in fix time intervals (i.e., rounds) some potential application are air pollution and temperature among others.. The second model considered a
sensing on demand (i.e., a user has a demand of information about a specific place and the query is
directed to a group of users within the target area). Finally, and less frequent scenario (e.g., natural
disasters) in which is common the use TDN-like infrastructure. Here the communication between
the PS system and the users (i.e., data collectors) pass through a sink, and data’s trade is encouraged
to maximize the users’ profit. There is not any incentive mechanism that support these three types
of sensing models.
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5.2.3

Type of Incentive Mechanism

The literature review showed that even the potential of gaming as a powerful motivator for
user participation in PS, only the work of Han et al. [26] have applied this mechanism to improve
participation in PS. Further other types of incentive schemes such as lotteries and gambling have
not been explore so far. On the other hand, although several experiments measure the level of
dropping out and retention this phenomenon only has been studied rigorously by Lee and Hoh [2]
and Musthag et a. [30]. The former in the context of recurrent reverse auctions and latter in the
context of the use of Uniform, Variable and Hidden micro-payments.

5.2.4

Working Autonomous, Intelligent Agents

Despite the abundant information in this field the literature review did not find any work in
which the incentive system works on a platform intelligent agents. However several of schemes
reviewed may be easily extended to this environment.

5.2.5

Economic Models

The reviewed of the state of the art showed that there are only two proposals of data markets, the
works of Liu et a. [17] and Lee and Hoh [2] respectively. The former is based on micro-economics
and includes the participation of an auctioneer (i.e., PS as entity) and n bidders (i.e., users), besides
includes a complete mechanism of incentives, allocation of resources, assignation of rewards, and
control of dropping out and retention. The latter, include a dynamic resource allocation and rewards
as well as the use of energy as mechanism to decrease the users’ reservation wage. Furthermore,
factors such as QoI satisfaction and network operator’s profits are elements to compute the user’s
rewards.

5.2.5.1 Proposal for a Data Market
Taking inspiration of the types of sensing model reviewed in section 5.2.2 as well as the works
of Liu et a. [17], Lee and Hoh [2], and Xie et al. [33] this thesis proposes a data market that
involves the following elements: sensor, sensor’s owners, data brokers, sensor’s manufacturers, a
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PS entity, and a PNP. The following is the description of the participants. Sensors (e.g., those
embedded in smartphones, or static sensor networks deployed in the area). Sensor’s owner i.e., the
carrier of a smartphone or the sensor network’s owners. Sensing data brokers i.e., an entity that
groups a set of sensor’s owners (e.g., PNP, CS project, or just an entity which has assigned a set of
sensor’s owners) in certain area based on some criteria (e.g., level of user privacy, sensor quality,
etc.). Sensor’s manufacturers this group may represents the hardware manufacturer. The following
is a description of the propose model. There is a querier that require for contextual information
of a site k, the querier submit a query q to the PS system (e.g., which may be part of PNP) and it
in turns re-submit the query to a set of {1 · · · n} data brokers which may provide the data. Data
brokers compute both the cost of the query’s answer and the level of quality that they may offer and
then they deliver this information back to the PS System. The PS system selects the data broker
that offers the best trade off among price, quality and coverage. Once the data broker is selected,
it in turns outsource the sensor’s owners by the use of the most convenient incentive mechanism
that maximizes the group utility. The data obtained from from the sensors’ owners are fused by
the data broker in order to offer the level of QoI required. On the other hand, sensors’ owners may
provide data to different data brokers and data brokers in turn may provide data to different PS
systems. In this context, as Xie et al. [33] propose, two sensor’s owners ai , bj who are leaving the
influence region of their corresponding data broker i and j, may wish to trade their data in order
to maximize their profits; within a time window while information is still valuable, or store it for
other type of clients. In a second scenario, when is required to sense a wide target area continuously
(e.g., temperature, humidity, pollution levels, etc) the PS system may use a reverse auction to select
the subset of data brokers that can offer the best trade of among price, quality and coverage. A
third scenario in which may be necessary to use a DTN-like infrastructure, the PS may use a data
trade protocol as propose by Xie et al. [33]. Finally, since the data’s price is a function of the
data’s quality which in turns depends of the sensor quality; a high demand of high quality sensors
will cause both the sensors manufacturers, phone’s manufacturer as well as PNP will facilitate the
users’ access to smartphones with each time more sensing capacities, compute power, and storage
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Figure 5.1: Proposal for a Incentive Architecture for PS

space for less price. Figure 5.1 sketches the main components of the three level incentive proposed
architecture.
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Appendix A: Permissions

Figure A.1: Permission
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Appendix B: Common Terms and Abbreviations Used in this Thesis

Table B.1: Common Terms and Abbreviations Used in this Thesis
Users
PS
CS
QoI
HC
CDS
SC
CI
RADP
VPC
RC
RADP-VPC-RC

GBMC
UDMA
EGDE3
GA
PNP
NFS
SMS
VOIP
DTN
ROI
CENS
CRM

Private owners of the sensors
Participatory Sensing
Citizen Science
Quality of Information
Human Computing
CrowdSourcing
Social Computing
Collective Intelligence
Reverse Auction Dynamic Price
Virtual Participation Credit
Recruitment
Reverse Auction Dynamic Price with Virtual
Participation Credit and Recruitment Algorithm
Greedy Budgeted Maximum Cover
Univariate Model Distribution Algorithm
Third Evolution step Generalized Differential Evolution
Genetic Algorithm
Phone Network Provider
National Science Foundation
Short Message Service
Voice over Internet Protocol
Delay Tolerant Networks
Return Of Investment
Center for Embedded Networked Sensing
Community Resource Messenger

53

